Vaccine diplomacy sees Russia boost its geopolitical leverage
Dr Diana galeeva
During the first coronavirus disease (COVID-19) lockdown in May last year, myself and colleagues from the prestigious Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) were invited to discuss effective approaches that would ensure the economic development of Russia in the context of the pandemic. This was at an international conference titled “Pandemic as a Motor of Transformation.”
My argument was that uncertainty about the consequences of COVID-19 raised questions about subsequent challenges, including the worldwide economic crisis and information wars, which would affect the formation of a new world order post-COVID-19. Similarly, Russia’s future role in the geopolitical arena remains decidedly open. Western experts have predicted a decrease in its role, either by noting that the increasingly important rivalry between China and the US has sidelined Moscow or by expecting a decrease in its geopolitical role due to its heavy dependence on China. Russian academics were more optimistic about the situation, highlighting the opportunities for Russia in the post-COVID-19 era. For example, Sergey Karaganov and Dmitry Suslov urged that “the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, which coincided with the pandemic that shook the world, should be used to launch new initiatives.”
As my contribution to the conference, I argued that these scholarly discussions hinge on a new understanding of COVID-19 diplomacy; namely one of putting greater emphasis on soft power strategies. This is in contrast to hard power (especially military power), which has in the past been the focus of discussions of Russian influence and strategy. I stated that cooperation with other states to achieve one global goal — containing the virus and overcoming the consequences of the pandemic — could create opportunities for Russia to establish new and crucial niche roles, such as becoming a global health power, thus increasing its status and influence. One notable COVID-19 diplomacy effort has been the development and distribution of vaccines.
One year on from this discussion and Russia’s policymakers do indeed appear to have chosen such a soft power strategy. Moscow has now registered four different vaccines: Sputnik V and EpiVacCorona in 2020 and CoviVak and Sputnik Light this year. Sputnik V has emerged as an effective soft power tool. It is now authorized in 67 countries that have a combined population of more than 3.5 billion.
According to a statement by the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, which centralizes the production of Sputnik V, will make more than 1.1 billion doses of the vaccine available worldwide — enough for almost 550 million people. And the RDIF has already concluded several agreements with other countries (including China, India, Brazil, Argentina, Italy, Serbia, Belarus, Egypt, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Turkey and Bahrain) to produce the vaccine. Discussions with other countries are also ongoing (this list includes Mexico, Venezuela, Sweden, Germany, France, Spain, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bangladesh and Armenia).
Through these initiatives, Russia increases its geopolitical leverage. It is no coincidence that the name Sputnik was chosen, echoing that of the first man-made satellite in orbit, which was a key aspect of the Soviet Union’s soft power agenda in the 20th century. However, such advances are balanced by the use of hard power, which results in deteriorating relations with certain powers, the EU in particular.
Russia’s military action over Ukraine has been particularly controversial. Moreover, concerns about cybersecurity have been dividing Europe over any reliance on Russian vaccines. For example, Sputnik V has been approved or is being assessed for approval in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which are prioritizing their national interests. Germany, among others, is at least prepared to consider it. However, French Minister of State for European Affairs Clement Beaune urged EU countries not to use the Russian or Chinese COVID-19 vaccines unless they are approved by the bloc’s medicines regulator, warning of a risk to the bloc’s unity and public health. The recent incident between Russia and the UK over warships in the Black Sea only adds to the worsening relations with European partners, limiting Russia’s vaccine diplomacy.
Sputnik V has been authorized in 67 countries that have a combined population of more than 3.5 billion.
What should we expect now? Russia will certainly continue its vaccine diplomacy, which has proved a successful tool worldwide. However, realistically it will be mainly successful among Russia-friendly governments, which accept its geopolitical role. By contrast, since soft power strategies can be badly damaged by hard power/military strategies, Russia’s soft power will be less effective among geopolitical competitors and where Moscow is seen as a threat. There are trade-offs between hard and soft power strategies and they are often incompatible. Russia will continue to balance both approaches’ respective applications, selectively presenting itself as a military power or a global health collaborator.
The writer is an Academic Visitor to St Antony’s College, Oxford University, having previously also been a Scholar-in-Residence at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies.
